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Note
Section 1983 Liability for Negligence
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 19832 was enacted to provide a federal remedy for indi-
viduals deprived of their civil rights by others acting under color of
state law. 3 The language of the statute does not require that the
act causing the injury be intentional rather than negligent in order
for liability to result,4 and such a distinction does not appear rele-
vant to the interpretation of the statute.5 Nonetheless, many
courts begin their inquiry into whether a claim for relief exists
under section 1983 by examining the character of the act which
gave rise to the injury.6 If it is determined that the injury was
caused by a negligent act, the suit is often dismissed.
To date, there has been only one case in which the United
States Supreme Court has dealt directly with the character of an
act in determining section 1983 liability.7 In Monroe v. Pape,8 the
1. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
3. Id.
4. It may be argued that the verb "subject to" implies that an intentional act is
required. However, BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1594 (4th ed. 1968) defines
"subject to" as "subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to, governed or
affected by," a definition which encompasses negligence as well as intent.
(Emphasis added.)
5. See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1975), affid on other
grounds, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the
"Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 23 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
7. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department
of Social Serv., 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). The portion of the decision in Monroe
which dealt with the intent requirement was not dealt with in Monell.
Monroe was overruled only insofar as it granted total immunity from section
1983 liability to local governmental units. 98 S. Ct. at 2022.
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
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Court rejected the contention that damages could be awarded only
if the defendant acted with a specific intent to deprive the injured
person of his or her civil rights,9 concluding that section 1983
"should be read against the background of tort liability that makes
a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."' 0
This conclusion was based on the Court's examination of congres-
sional purpose in enacting section 1983:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied
by the state agencies. 11
Because the common law of tort provides liability for negligent
as well as intentional acts and because the Court employed the
word "neglect" in its explanation of congressional purpose,
Monroe became the basis for lower federal court decisions that
held damages may be awarded for deprivations of federal rights
9. 365 U.S. at 187. Section 1983, at the time of the events giving rise to the opin-
ion in Monroe, was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1979. In Monroe, the Court com-
pared section 1983 to its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976), which
had been interpreted in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945), to
require "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right," and con-
cluded that such an interpretation should not be given a provision for a civil
remedy. 365 U.S. at 187.
The primary issue in Monroe was not whether intent to deprive a person
of a federal right was required to maintain a section 1983 action, but whether
police officers conducting a search violative of the fourth amendment could
be characterized as acting "under color of state law." 365 U.S. at 175-84. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, dissenting as to the Court's interpretation of "under color of
state law," agreed that specific intent to deprive a person of a federally pro-
tected right is not a prerequisite for section 1983 liability:
First, the word 'ilfully"... from which the requirement of intent
was derived in Screws does not appear in [section 1983]. Second ..
the constitutional scruples concerning vagueness which were
deemed to compel the Screws construction have less force in the con-
text of a civil proceeding, and [section 19831, insofar as it creates an
action for damages, must be read in light of the familiar basis of tort
liability that a man is responsible for the natural consequences of his
acts. Third, even in the criminal area, the specific intent demanded
by Screws has proved to be an abstraction serving the purposes of a
constitutional need without impressing any actual restrictions upon
the nature of the crime which the jury tries.
Id. at 206-07 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). Justice
Frankfurter further noted that "[c]ivil liability has always been drawn from
such indefinite standards as reasonable care, a man of ordinary prudence,
foreseeability, etc." Id. at 207 n.6.
10. 365 U.S. at 187.
11. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
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resulting from negligent acts.12 Although the majority of the cir-
cuits appear to have approved actions based on negligence,'3 a mi-
nority has imposed liability only for injuries arising from grossly
negligent or intentional acts.14 As a result of the conflict among
the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Procunier v.
Navarette'5 to decide the issue.' 6 However, the Court disposed of
12. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
13. Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 135 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885
(1975) (negligence of prison warden in allowing inhumane conditions to ex-
ist); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1972) (negligent failure of
clerk of courts to file prisoner's application for post-conviction relief); Carter
v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1975) (negligence of prison guards in
allowing prisoner's property to be exposed to theft); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468
F.2d 1072,1077 n.7 (6th Cir. 1972) (failure to provide medical assistance follow-
ing car accident); Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 281 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (negli-
gent failure to mail prisoner's correspondence); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d
877, 882 (10th Cir. 1974) (placing in drunk tank man in diabetic shock- conduct
"grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive"); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d
358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (negligent supervision of subordinates).
14. Hoitt v. Vitel, 497 F.2d 598, 601 (1st Cir. 1974) (complaint must allege malice,
excessive neglect or arbitrary acts); Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279 (3d
Cir. 1972) ("wrongful intention or culpable negligence" necessary); Bonner v.
Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("mere negligence" not
actionable); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1973) (dicta).
But see Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1972) (liability "for misfea-
sance and for nonfeasance").
Two district courts in the Eighth Circuit, including one in Nebraska, have
recently upheld section 1983 actions alleging negligence on the part of prison
officials. In Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-57 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978), the court
granted summary judgment to a prisoner who failed to receive a mail-order
hobby kit as a result of the negligence of prison officials in distributing the
mail. The court stated: "The negligence of the officials in failing to follow
their own policies concerning the distribution of mail resulted in a loss of
personal property for [the plaintiff], which loss should not go vithout re-
dress." Id., slip op. at 5.
In another recent case, a district court in the Eighth Circuit upheld a sec-
tion 1983 claim based on the negligent failure of county officials to provide a
prison guard. The negligence resulted in the death of one inmate and injury
to another in a fire. Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Ark. 1978).
15. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
16. The question on which the Court granted certiorari was "[w]hether negligent
failure to mail certain of a prisoner's outgoing letters states a cause of action
under section 1983." Id. at 559 n.6.
Certiorari was not granted on the other two questions contained in the
prison officials' application:
2. Whether removal of a prisoner as a prison librarian and termina-
tion of a law student-inmate visitation program in which he partici-
pated states a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act for either
knowingly or negligently interfering with the prisoner's right of ac-
cess to the courts.
3. Whether deliberate refusal to mail certain of a prisoner's corre-
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the case on other grounds, and the issue remains unsettled.1 7
Although the language of the statute does not limit liability to
intentional acts,18 there has been reluctance on the part of many
courts to permit the application of the statute to negligent acts. 19
This reluctance stems in part from philosophical concerns about
the substitution of federal for state tort law remedies, 20 specifi-
cally, from fear that section 1983 has created "a body of general
federal tort law."2 1 It also stems from administrative concerns
about the increasingly heavy case load imposed on federal courts
by civil rights actions, particularly those brought by prisoners. 22
spondence in 1971-1972 prior to Procunier v. Martinez... and refusal
to send certain correspondence by registered mail states a cause of
action for violation of his First Amendment right to free expression.
Id. at 559-60 n.6
17. The Court held that the defendants were entitled to good faith immunity
from damage liability under section 1983:
[T]here was no "clearly established" First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment right with respect to the correspondence of convicted prisoners
in 1971-1972. As a matter of law, therefore, there was no basis for re-
jecting the immunity defense on the ground that petitioners knew or
should have known that their alleged conduct violated a constitu-
tional right. Because they could not reasonably have been expected
to be aware of a constitutional right that had not yet been declared,
petitioners did not act with such disregard for the established law
that their conduct "cannot reasonably be characterized as in good
faith."
Id. at 565 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)) (footnote
omitted).
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the Court ought to have
answered in the negative the question on which it had granted certiorari: "I
would hold that one who does not intend to cause and does not exhibit delib-
erate indifference to the risk of causing the harm that gives rise to a constitu-
tional claim is not liable for damages under § 1983." Id. at 568.
Had the Court granted certiorari on the second question presented in the
petition for certiorari, see note 16 supra, it would have been unable to dispose
of the case on the ground that good faith immunity was established as a mat-
ter of law. The second question alleged both negligent and intentional inter-
ference with the prisoner's right of access to the courts, a right well
established at the time the alleged violation occurred. For a discussion of the
development of the constitutional right of access to the courts, see Potuto,
The Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds have Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207
(1978).
18. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
19. See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc);
Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1973).
20. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698-701 (1976).
21. Id. at 701.
22. In 1976, 7,460 civil rights actions were filed in federal district courts by prison-
ers and 12,329 were filed by non-prisoners. These actions were filed both
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and directly under the United States Constitu-
tion, and they comprised 5% of the federal civil docket in 1976. ANNuAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OffiCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CouRTs 129, 133, tbL C-2 (1976). To place this figure in perspective it should
[VOL. 58:271
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Because the resolution of the issue remains uncertain, this note
will examine the development of liability based on negligence,23
the framework established by Supreme Court decisions,24 and the
usefulness of distinguishing between negligent and intentional
acts to determine the scope of section 1983 in light of its historical
purpose.25
H. DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY BASED ON
NEGLIGENCE
Monroe v. Pape26 provided the underlying rationale for section
1983 actions based on negligence because, although it involved an
intentional act, the Supreme Court suggested that inquiry ought to
focus on whether the defendant caused a deprivation of a federal
right while acting under color of state law, and not on his or her
state of mind. 27 The cases credited with establishing liability for
negligent acts, Joseph v. Rowlen 28 and Whirl v. Kern,2 9 also in-
volved intentional torts. However, the language employed by the
courts in those decisions was sufficiently broad to provide a basis
for subsequent section 1983 actions based on negligence.
In Joseph v. Rowlen,30 the court upheld an action for false ar-
rest, an intentional tort, but noted that nothing in the language of
the statute requires a showing of flagrancy or improper motive.31
Whirl v. Kern32 involved the intentional tort of false imprisonment,
but the action (or non-action) causing the injury was negligent
rather than intentional. In Whirl, the plaintiff was lawfully impris-
oned, but the charges were later dropped. As a result of negligence
in processing records, the sheriff did not discover the dismissal
be noted that 25,736 non-constitutional tort actions were filed, comprising
19.8% of the civil docket. Id. at 174. Diversity jurisdiction cases numbered
31,675 and comprised 24.3% of the civil docket Id. at 122.
See Friedman, The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation, 5
HOFSTRA I REV. 501, 501-02 (1977). See also Burger, C.J., Report on the Fed-
eral Judicial Branch--1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1128 (1973) (suggestion of alter-
native procedures for handling prisoner civil rights actions).
23. See § 1 of text infra.
24. See § HI of text infra.
25. See § IV of text infra.
26. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
98 S. Ct 2018 (1978).
27. Id. at 187. See notes 7-11 & accompanying text supra.
28. 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968).
29. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
30. 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968).
31. Id. at 369. In Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
the seventh circuit reanalyzed Joseph and concluded that because the police
officer did not have probable cause at the time of the arrest, liability was in
actuality based on intent.
32. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
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and retained the prisoner for nine months after the charges were
dropped.3 3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the language in Monroe stating that section 1983 was intended
to protect federal rights infringed "by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise"34 "suggests that a federal forum
is no less desirable for the inadvertent than for the malicious viola-
tion of constitutionally protected rights."35 It held that the sheriff
had a duty to his prisoner to release him when the charges were
dismissed and that his failure to learn of the dismissal was "as a
matter of law, ignorance for an unreasonable time. '3 6
Since the decisions in Joseph and Whirl, courts have upheld
section 1983 actions based on negligence in a variety of situations,
among them the negligent failure to fie papers necessary for a
prisoner to apply for state post-conviction relief,3 7 negligent failure
to mail a prisoner's correspondence, 38 negligent failure to protect a
prisoner's property from theft,3 9 and failure to act to prevent other
police officers from beating a suspect.40 As a result of the Supreme
Court decision in Estelle v. Gamble,41 isolated instances of medical
malpractice or failure to provide medical treatment can no longer
give rise to section 1983 damage actions brought by prisoners alleg-
33. Id. at 786. At trial, in response to special interrogatories, the jury found that
the sheriff was not negligent in detaining the prisoner, that the prisoner was
contributorily negligent for failing to seek release, and that no damages were
sustained as a result of the nine-month imprisonment. Id.
34. 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), quoted in Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d at 788 (emphasis
added).
35. 407 F.2d at 788. The court also stated, "We find the facts of the instant case
clearly illustrative of the great harm which may be done to constitutional
rights even in the absence of malice or negligence." Id. n.7.
36. Id. at 792. Although the court used the traditional negligence terms of "duty"
and 'reasonableness," it held that the sheriff had constructive notice of the
prisoner's release and was thus liable as a matter of law for the intentional
tort of false imprisonment. The court may have found this result necessary
in view of the jury verdict that the sheriff was not negligent.
37. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972). Contra, Jenkins v. Meyers, 338
F. Supp. 383 (N.D. flL 1972), affd mem., 481 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973). In
Jenkins, the prisoner's transcript was negligently mailed to an incorrect ad-
dress.
38. Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 281 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub noma. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555(1978).
39. Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975). Cf. Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-
57 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978) (prisoner granted summary judgment in action al-
leging prison officials' negligence in distributing mail resulted in theft of his
property). Contra, Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1976) (en
banc).
40. Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1972). Contra, Howell v. Cataldi, 464
F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1972).
41. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
[VOL. 58:271
SECTION 1983 NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
ing cruel and unusual punishment.4 2 However, recovery for negli-
gent failure to provide medical care has not been entirely
foreclosed. In Fitzke v. Shappell,43 the negligent failure to provide
medical care to a prisoner injured in an automobile accident led
the court to sustain a fourteenth amendment claim alleging a dep-
rivation of life without due process of law.44
Although causes of action based on negligence have arisen in a
variety of contexts, they have been most useful as a means of
reaching supervisory officials who are negligent in overseeing and
training subordinates.45 Section 1983 has been held to incorporate
elements of state law protecting supervisory officials from vicari-
ous liability for torts committed by their subordinates;4 6 therefore,
plaintiffs have found it necessary to sue supervisory officials di-
rectly for negligent performance of duty in order to encourage offi-
cial responsibility or to reach someone financially capable of
42. "Deliberate indifference" must be alleged. Id. at 106. See notes 75-79 & ac-
companying text infra.
43. 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972).
44. Id. at 1077 n.7.
While it might be said that appellants have asserted that appellees
were negligent in failing to provide medical care for Fitzke, the argu-
ment that appellees' omission does not rise to constitutional propor-
tions ignores the fact that as a result of arrest and incarceration by
appellees the appellant was effectively denied the opportunity of ob-
taining the aid which might have prevented serious brain damage.
45. Kellerman v. Askew, 541 F.2d 1089, 1092 (5th Cir. 1976) (negligent failure to
make inquiries); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 135 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1975) (warden "knew or should have known" of subhu-
man prison conditions); Beverly v. Norris, 470 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1972) (negli-
gent failure to supervise police officer); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th
Cir. 1972) (failure to act to prevent other police from beating plaintiff); Rob-
erts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866,
modified, 456 F.2d 834 (1971) (negligent entrustment of prison trusty with
gun); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (negli-
gent supervision of subordinates); Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20,22-23 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (negligence in supervising and training police); Doe v. Swinson, 45
U.S.L.W. 2304 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 1976) (sheriff failed to fulfill responsibility to
protect prisoner); Smith v. Wickline, 396 F. Supp. 555, 563 (W.D. Okla. 1975)
(dictum) (police supervisor could be held liable for acts of subordinate);
Moon v. Winfield, 368 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (supervisor's negligent fail-
ure to act).
46. See, e.g., Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 282 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Jennings v. Da-
vis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional
Tort Under Section 1983 The-State-of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. Cum. I- REv.
45, 60-61 (1977). But see Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136 (5th Cir. 1975)
(prison officials may be held vicariously liable for acts of subordinates). See
also Comment, Section 1983, the Eleventh Amendmen and General Princi-
ples of Tort Immunities and Defenses: Who'is Left ,to Sue? 45' U.M.K.C. ,L.
Rav. 29, 47-48 (1976).
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compensating for their injuries. 47 If section 1983 actions based on
negligence were abolished, supervisory officials and local political
bodies would seldom be found to have the intent to cause injury
that would be necessary to hold them liable for committing an in-
tentional tort.48
II. FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED BY THE SUPREME
COURT
In addition to the suggestion in Monroe that actions based on
negligence may be cognizable under section 1983,49 there appears
to be an implicit recognition of such actions in the Supreme
Court's development of tests for a good faith defense to section
1983 actions. In Wood v. Strickland,50 the Court promulgated both
a subjective and an objective test for good faith immunity. The
subjective test is whether the official acted with "malicious inten-
tion to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other in-
jury";51 the objective test is whether the official "knew or
reasonably should have known" that his or her actions would vio-
late "clearly established constitutional rights. ' 52 In order to un-
derstand the import of these tests, it is necessary to examine
traditional concepts of intent and negligence.5 3 The Restatement of
Torts4 provides the following explanation of the distinction be-
tween intentional and negligent acts:
It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done and this, even
though the actor realizes or should realize that it contains a very grave risk
of bringing about the [injury]. Such realization may make the actor's con-
duct negligent or even reckless but unless he realizes that to a substantial
certainty, the- [injury] will result, the actor has not that intention which is
necessary to make him liable... .55
47. Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 60-61.
48. Id. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
49. See notes 7-11 & accompanying text supra.
50. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
51. Id. at 322.
52. Id.
53. 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) defines negligence as "con-
duct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk of harm It does not include conduct reck-
lessly disregardful of an interest of others." Intent is defined as denoting
"that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." 1 id. § 8A.
54. 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 13, Comment d (1934).
55. Id. (emphasis added). This comment was replaced by 1 REsTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965), quoted in note 53 supra. The Reporter's Notes
indicate that it was intended that § 8A incorporate the rule of Comment d as
applied in Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), second
appeal, 49 Wash. 2d 499, 304 P.2d 681 (1956). 1 RESTATEENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRs § 8A app. (1966).
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The'language in the Restatement indicates that a "knew or rea-
sonably should have known" standard goes to negligent rather
than intentional conduct,5 6 for intent requires that the actor be
substantially certain an injury will result. By holding that an offi-
cial may not claim good faith immunity if he or she "knew or rea-
sonably should have known ' 57 that the action would lead to a
deprivation of a federal right, the Supreme Court seems to have
acknowledged that section 1983 actions may be brought for negli-
gent acts.&5 8 Indeed, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,59 one of the cases in
which the Court developed the standards for good faith immu-
nity,60 the action of state officials in sending armed national
guardsmen onto the Kent State Campus seems more properly
characterized as negligent rather than intentional, as alleged in the
complaint.6 1 If common law standards of intent and negligence are
to be employed, it would seem impossible to establish that the offi-
cials knew to a substantial certainty that the guardsmen would fire
on the students. 6 2
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Carey v. Piphus63 and
Monell v. Department of Social Services,6 4 lend additional support
to the adoption of a negligence standard for section 1983 liability.
56. 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965):
The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of
causing an invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man would
do so while exercising
(a) such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory,
knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment as
a reasonable man would have; and
(b) such superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, in-
telligence, and judgment as the actor himself has.
57. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
58. If the actor should have known, but did not know, the result of the act, it is
difficult to understand how he or she could be found to have known with sub-
stantial certainty the consequences that would follow. See Brief for Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, at 9-11, Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555 (1978).
59. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
60. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
61. The complaint charged that the defendants "intentionally, recklessly, will-
fully and wantonly" sent guardsmen onto the campus, resulting in the death
of three students. 416 U.S. at 235.
62. Often the only way to effect meaningful change in a pattern of uncon-
stitutional conduct by a government agency, such as a police depart-
ment, is by extending potential liability to the policy-maklng officials
in that agency. Accordingly, if a negligence theory of liability were
not recognized under section 1983, it rarely would be possible to
reach such officials, because it is often difficult to prove their active
involvement in the unconstitutional conduct.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 60-61 (footnote omitted).
63. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
64. 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
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In Monell, the Court overturned the portion of the decision in
Monroe that held municipalities and other local governmental
units immune from liability.65 The Court stated that "there can be
no doubt that [section 1983] was intended to provide a remedy, to
be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of feder-
ally protected rights. '66 In Carey, the Court endorsed the award of
only nominal damages unless actual damages are proved,67 stating
that the "basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to
compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of con-
stitutional rights,"68 not to deter such deprivations.69 If compensa-
tion for the deprivation of constitutional rights is indeed' the pur-
pose of section 1983, it does not seem to be relevant whether that
deprivation occurred as a result of a negligent or an intentional act.
The Supreme Court has established a basis for allowing actions
based on negligence, but language in three recent decisions indi-
cates that it may not favor such actions.7 0 In Paul v. Davis,71 the
Court refused to allow a section 1983 action claiming damages for
loss of reputation caused by police negligence in mailing a circular
identifying the plaintiff as a shoplifter. The Court concluded that
no constitutional deprivation had occurred because reputation is
not an interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.7 2 Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court, stated that claims of
this type ought to be pursued under state tort law, not section 1983:
[Slince it is surely far more clear from the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment that "life" is protected against state deprivation than it is that
reputation is protected against state injury, it would be difficult to see why
the survivors of an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or
negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle, would not
have claims equally cognizable under § 1983.
It is hard to find any logical stopping place to such a line of reasoning.
[The plaintiff's] construction would seem almost necessarily to result in
every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state
official acting under "color of law" establishing a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
7 3
Although the result in Paul was based on the Court's determina-
65. Id. at 2022. The Court's holding was limited to the immunity of municipalities
and local governmental units from liability under section 1983 and did not
disturb state and federal decisions extending immunity to these entities in
other areas of the law.
66. Id. at 2041.
67. 435 U.S. at 266.
68. Id. at 254.
69. Id. at 256.
70. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
71. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
72. Id. at 701.
73. Id. at 698-99.
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tion that no deprivation of a federal right had occurred, its lan-
guage has been quoted as support for the position that negligence
is not actionable under section 1983.74
In another section 1983 action, Estelle v. Gamble,75 the Court
held allegations of medical malpractice insufficient to establish
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. It
stated that "[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitu-
tional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to
state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. '76 The Court noted that deliberate indifference
could be "manifested by prison doctors in their response to the
prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with
the treatment once prescribed."77
In dissent, Mr. Justice Stevens criticized the Court's emphasis
of intent:
[B]y its repeated references to "deliberate indifference" and the 'Inten-
tional" denial of adequate medical care, I believe the Court improperly
attaches significance to the subjective motivation of the defendant as a
criterion for determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has been
inflicted. Subjective motivation may well determine what, if any, remedy
is appropriate.... However, whether the constitutional standard has
been violated should turn on the character of the punishment rather than
the motivation of the individual who inflicted it.
78
Although Estelle requires "deliberate indifference" rather than
mere negligence to recover for medical mistreatment of prison-
ers,79 it is important to note that the Court focused not on whether
74. Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 566 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc):
In Paul v. Davis... the Supreme Court refused to hold that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983
"make actionable many wrongs inflicted by government employees
which had heretofore been thought to give rise only to state law tort
claims." Bonner does not contend that the guards deliberately took
his trial transcript in violation of the due process clause. Rather he
asserts that their negligence permitted some one else to take it. As
Paul explains, the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to such a
claim.
As far as it goes, this reading of Paul as turning on the interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment is correct. The court then quotes the passage
from Paul dealing with creating a "body of general federal tort law" from the
civil rights statutes, 424 U.S. at 701, and concludes: "If Section 1983 is to be
extended to cover claims based on mere negligence, the Supreme Court
should lead the way." 545 F.2d at 567.
75. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
76. Id. at 106.
77. Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
79. Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 58 (footnote omitted).
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the character of the defendant's act was actionable under section
1983, but on whether a violation of the constitutional prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment had, in fact, occurred. This is
analogous to the Court's decision in Paul which turned on whether
a fourteenth amendment violation had occurred, not on whether
the act was intentional or negligent.80
Another recent Supreme Court decision contains language
which may be construed as restricting section 1983 actions based
on negligence. In Rizzo v. Goode,8 ' the Court held that a federal
district judge exceeded his power to provide equitable relief under
section 1983 by placing the Philadelphia Police Department under
court supervision when a pattern of police misconduct had not
been clearly established.8 2 Although the Court's decision was
based on the scope of federal equitable power, Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Court, discussed the absence of affirmative
misconduct on the part of supervisory officials:
The theory of liability... urged upon us by [plaintiffs] is that even with-
out a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small percentage
of the police force, [defendants'] failure to act in the face of a statistical
pattern is indistinguishable from the active conduct enjoined in Hague
and Medrano. [Plaintiffs] posit a constitutional "duty" on the part of [de-
fendants] (and a corresponding "right" of the citizens of Philadelphia) to
"eliminate" future misconduct, a "default" of that affirmative duty being
shown by the statistical pattern, the District Court is empowered to act in
[defendants'] stead and take whatever preventive measures are neces-
sary, within its discretion, to secure the "right" at issue. Such reasoning,
however, blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language in
a way which would be quite inconsistent with the words Congress chose
in § 1983.83
While this language suggests that negligence of a supervisory offi-
cial in supervising and training subordinates may not be sufficient
to support liability, it is not central to the Court's decision and thus
is not determinative of the issue.
IV. ANALYSIS
The use of an intent-negligence standard as a means of deter-
mining the scope of section 1983 actions is deficient in that (1)
courts often blur the distinction between intent and negligence, 84
80. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
81. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
82. Id. at 373-77, 379-80.
83. Id. at 375-76. In the quotation, the Court cited Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), and Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), both of which enjoined po-
lice harassment of union organizers.
84. See notes 87-96 & accompanying text infra. The blurring of the distinction
between intent and negligence has been used to defeat recovery by deserving
plaintiffs in other areas of the law as well. In Moos v. United States, 118 F.
Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954), affd, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955), the court pre-
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(2) the standard does not provide an effective tool for determining
which actions are more properly left to state tort law determina-
tion,85 and (3) it is not a discriminating method of limiting the bur-
den civil rights actions impose on the federal courts.86
That the distinction between intent and negligence has been
blurred by courts relying on the standard is evident in a recent
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Bon-
ner v. Coughlin,87 the court concluded that section 1983 actions
may not be based on negligence88 but, instead of overruling prior
decisions in which it had appeared to approve liability for negli-
gent acts,89 the court simply reanalyzed its earlier holdings.90
Thus in Byrd v. Brishke,91 in which some police officers stood by
while others beat a suspect, intent was found in their "purposeful
nonfeasance"9 2 in allowing the beating to continue. Although it
may be arguable that an omission to act is intentional if the indi-
vidual realizes that the consequences are "substantially certain to
result,"93 omissions to act have traditionally been characterized as
negligent. 94 For example, in Howell v. Cataldi,95 a case involving a
similar fact pattern, the court dismissed the action because the
vented recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act by holding that the mis-
taken amputation of plaintiffs left leg rather than his right leg constituted an
assault and battery, i.e., an intentional rather than a negligent tort. The Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity for negligent butnot
for most intentional torts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). The court based its
conclusion on the premise that nonconsensual surgery results in assault and
battery "regardless of lack of intent or negligence." 118 F. Supp. at 276. See 38
MINN. I REV. 890 (1954); 7 VAND. L. REV. 283 (1954).
85. See notes 97-114 & accompanying text infra.
86. See notes 115-19 & accompany text infra.
87. 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
88. Id. at 567. "[Tlhe introduction of a general intent yardstick into the determi-
nation of whether conduct is State action or has been performed 'under color
of state law' does not mean that mere negligence is actionable under Section
1983."
89. Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th
Cir. 1972); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968).
90. 545 F.2d at 568-69. The court recharacterized its prior holdings in the follow-
ing manner. Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974) (defendants knew of
repeated assaults on decedent); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972)
("purposeful nonfeasance"); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968)
(police knew they lacked probable cause to arrest).
91. 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
92. 545 F.2d at 568.
93. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). See note 53 supra.
94. 2 RE STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965). Since courts have been re-
luctant even to hold a defendant negligent for failure to rescue, e.g., a doctor
who does not come to the aid of an accident victim, it is doubtful that they
would characterize a failure to act as an intentional tort. See Note, The Fail-
ure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLmn. L REv. 631 (1952).
95. 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
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plaintiff did not allege "wrongful intention or culpable negli-
gence."96 If an intentional act can be discerned in a failure to act, it
seems probable that intent will also be discerned in other acts
which courts have traditionally characterized as negligent. In view
of this blurring of the line between negligence and intent, the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision not to allow section 1983 actions based on
negligence appears meaningless.
Another difficulty with employing an intent-negligence stan-
dard is that it does not provide a reliable method of differentiating
between claims which are properly cognizable under section 1983
and those which are more appropriately consigned to state tort
law.97 The example that Justice Rehnquist provided in Paul v.
Davis98 of an arguable fourteenth amendment claim arising out of
a fatality caused by a sheriff's negligent operation of a government
vehicle 99 offers a useful starting point for analysis. Even if one ac-
cepts Justice Rehnquist's premise that negligence claims of this
nature are properly ones for state tort law determination, it does
not follow that all negligent torts committed by state officials
should be allocated to state law and all intentional torts should be
allocated to section 1983. For example, if an on-duty police officer
assaults a neighbor whose child has broken the police officer's win-
dow, the tort is intentional but it seems improbable that Justice
Rehnquist would wish to allow recovery for it under section 1983
any more than for the automobile accident. On the other hand, if a
police department has an established policy of permitting high
speed chases arising out of minor traffic infractions, it is arguable
that those injured in resultant accidents have a fourteenth amend-
ment civil rights claim, if not against the individual police car oper-
ator, then against those individuals who established the policy.
And, despite the Court's language in Rizzo v. Goode, 0 0 such a
claim should arise even though supervisory officials had merely ac-
quiesced in rather than actually established such a policy.
One proposed method of distinguishing between state tort
claims and federal civil rights claims is a constitutional duty ap-
proach.'0 1 One commentator has stated that "[n]otions of negli-
gence and intentional conduct tend to obscure the threshold
concern in 1983 cases. That concern should be whether a constitu-
tional duty derived from the fourteenth amendment has been
breached."'1 2 Thus in the case in which some police officers stood
96. Id. at 279.
97. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698-701 (1976).
98. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
99. Id. at 698.
100. 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976). See note 83 & accompanying text supra.
101. Nahmod, supra note 5, at 22.
102. Id. at 23.
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by while others beat a suspect,10 3 their nonaction could be charac-
terized as a breach of a constitutional duty to protect citizens from
police brutality. The constitutional duty approach was cited with
approval by Mr. Justice Stevens when he sat on the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.10 4
The constitutional duty approach does not, however, appear to
provide a more definitive standard for determining liability under
section 1983 than existing standards. Embedded in the concept of
a constitutional duty are the two requirements for any cause of ac-
tion under section 1983: (1) whether the individual was deprived of
a federal right and (2) whether the individual causing the injury
acted under color of state law.105 The requirement that the claim-
ant be deprived of a right guaranteed by the constitution or laws of
the United States was properly the focus of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Paul v. Davis10 6 and Estelle v. Gamble.0 7 In Paul the
relevant inquiry was whether loss of reputation is a deprivation of
liberty within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, 08 not
whether the police officers acted negligently or intentionally in dis-
seminating the circular identifying the claimant as a shoplifter.
And in Estelle, the proper object of the Court's attention was
whether a simple incident of medical malpractice violates the
eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment, 09
not whether negligence is actionable under section 1983.
The requirement.that the act leading to liability be committed
by an individual acting under color of state law also provides a pos-
sible means of differentiating between state tort law claims and
federal civil rights actions. The -injury must result from a
"[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law. .. ."11o However, if the acts are committed in pursu-
103. Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
104. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1975), affid on other grounds,
545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc). Justice (then Judge) Stevens charac-
terized as "broad and somewhat abstract" the issue whether negligence is
actionable under section 1983. Id.
A constitutional duty on the part of supervisory officials was also a basis
for liability in Norton v. McKeon, 444 F. Supp. 384, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1977), and
Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 152 (ED. Pa. 1977).
105. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
106. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
107. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
108. 424 U.S. at 701.
109. 429 U.S. at 104-05. For a different approach to this issue, see Kirkpatrick,
supra note 46, at 59-67. He asserts "that the standard of liability under sec-
tion 1983 should vary depending upon the constitutional claim being as-
serted." Id. at 49.
110. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941), quoted in Monroe v. Pape,
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ance of an official duty,"' it is not necessary that the actions be
"officially authorized, or lawful."112 Although the under color of
state law requirement has been construed broadly to include ac-
tions of private individuals acting in accordance with customs or
usages having the force of state law,113 it is not clear whether the
interpretation would extend to a state officer committing a tort
arising in a personal rather than an official context. For example, it
is arguable that the on-duty police officer is not misusing power
"clothed with the authority of the state" when assaulting a neigh-
bor on a personal matter. Because the tort arises out of a personal
grudge, which did not arise in conjunction with an official duty, it
may be possible to conclude that liability should be determined
under state rather than federal law. Conversely, the misuse-or
disuse-of power bestowed by the state is a reason supervisory
officials have been held liable for negligence in supervising and
training subordinates who have acted to deprive others of their
constitutional rights. 114
Although careful inquiry into whether a constitutional right has
been infringed or whether the act was committed by an individual
acting under color of state law would lead to results more consis-
tent with the purpose of section 1983, more judicial time would be
consumed than if the action were summarily dismissed because it
was based on negligence. 1 5 For that reason, reliance bn the in-
tent-negligence standard has been described as a "floodgates" po-
sition designed to prevent civil rights actions from inundating the
federal courts.116 The dissent in Bonner v. Coughlin117 stated that
"It] here can be no question but that it performs that task admira-
bly. The same function would be served, however, by rejecting
every section 1983 case brought by plaintiffs with last names begin-
ning with letters that come after 'K' in the alphabet."118 Other cri-
teria, such as the constitutional duty approach, 119 may require
some judicial time, but they more effectively redress the depriva-
tion of civil rights-the purpose for which section 1983 was en-
acted.
365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social
Serv., 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
111. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 184.
112. Adickes v. S.HL Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
113. Id. at 162-69.
114. See cases cited in note 45 supra.
115. For statistics on the number of civil rights actions filed in federal district
courts, see note 22 supra.
116. Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
117. Id. at 569.
118. Id. at 572.
119. Nahmod, supra note 5, at 22. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not take advan-
tage of the opportunity presented by Procunier v. Navarette120 to
dismiss as irrelevant the issue of whether negligence is actionable
under section 1983. Although elimination of the intent-negligence
standard will not assist in reducing the heavy case load imposed
by section 1983 suits, it will lead the courts to develop more fully
the tests for whether a constitutional right has been infringed and
whether an action has been committed under color of state law.
Such a development will result in greater fulfillment of the pur-
pose of section 1983. In Monroe v. Pape,121 Justice Frankfurter ad-
vocated the elimination of the specific intent requirement by
stating, "If the courts are to enforce [section 1983], it is an unhappy
form of judicial disapproval to surround it with doctrines which
partially and unequally obstruct its operation."' 22 The intent-neg-
ligence standard serves no purpose other than to obstruct the op-
eration of section 1983 and, consequently, ought to follow the
specific intent requirement into the decisional graveyard.
Terrill Hyde Huntington '79
120. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
121. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 98
S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
122. Id. at 207 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part). See note 9 supra.
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